1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 2 3 MOHAMMED KAMAL HOSSAIN, ) APPEAL NO. 08-17754 4 D.C. No. 08-0016 - ARM 5 Plaintiff-Appellant, Garapan, Saipan Thursday, October 16, 2008 6 vs. 9:00 a.m. 7 COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MOTION TO DISMISS MARIANA ISLANDS, ET AL., 8 Defendants-Appellees. 9 10 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALEX R. MUNSON 12 CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 13 14 **APPEARANCES:** 15 Omar Calimbas For Plaintiff: 16 Attorney at Law Micronesian Legal Services P. O. Box 500826 17 Saipan, MP 96950 18 Telephone: (670) 234-7729 Facsimile: (670) 235-6101 19 For Defendants: Jessica Cruz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 20 Victor M. Lawrance, Principal Assistant Director, DOJ, Civil Division & 21 Kathleen R. Busenkell, Assistant Attorney General, Immigration Division, CNMI 22 23 SANAE N. SHMULL 24 **Retired Official Court Reporter** 

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COURTROOM CLERK MS. MATSUNAGA: Please rise. 1 THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. 2 COURTROOM CLERK MS. MATSUNAGA: Your Honor, please, 3 this is Civil Action No 08-0016, Mohammad Kamal Hossain v. 4 5 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, et al., coming up for a Motion to Dismiss hearing. 6 7 Will counsel please state your appearance? MS. CRUZ: Jessica Cruz for the United States, and I 8 9 have with me Victor Lawrance who's an attorney with DOJ's Office of Immigration Litigation and he's here from Washington, 10 11 D.C. 12 MR. LAWRANCE: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. 13 MS. BUSENKELL: Kathleen Busenkell on behalf of the 14 15 Commonwealth. 16 MR. CALIMBAS: Omar Calimbas with Micronesian Legal Services. 17 THE COURT: Good morning. 18 COURT REPORTER: Can you speak up, please. 19 MR. CALIMBAS: Omar Calimbas for the plaintiff. 20 21 THE COURT: Yeah, I have a tentative ruling on both of these motions. The tentative ruling is to grant the motions. 22 I think that the case is res judicata. 23 The defendant was, or the plaintiff was aware of the 24

derivative actions as early as his Second Amended Complaint.

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And after his Fifth Amended Complaint, even though that wasn't in there, the settlement agreement agreed that he would waive, for the consideration of \$25,000.00, any rights that he knew of, didn't know of that may arise in the future that in any way were connected with this case. And so rather than hearing from the moving parties, I'd rather hear from the plaintiff, and then I'll give the moving parties an opportunity. You can make any record that you deem necessary.

MR. CALIMBAS: And you just wanted to hear on the issue of res judicata?

THE COURT: Okay, why don't you come to the lectern?

MR. CALIMBAS: And you -- I just wanted to make sure
you wanted me to comment on the issue of res judicata?

THE COURT: I don't particularly want you to comment on anything; however, I will give you an opportunity to make any record that you think you need to make.

MR. CALIMBAS: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. With, with respect to the issue of res judicata, I think one thing that wasn't mentioned in the motions to dismiss, in any of the replies, was the purpose behind that doctrine. And, basically, it's to ensure that the party that sought to be precluded had a full opportunity and fair opportunity to litigate in the earlier case.

Now what was litigated in the earlier case and was settled upon? I think we can make definitely two

different claims here with this case and the prior case.

In discerning what the conditions for res judicata, one thing that's clear is that there has to be identity with certain aspect of the matters. One of them, most particularly, is with the cause of action.

The prior case, in the Fifth Amended Complaint, talks of the rights of the plaintiff. A settlement agreement under its terms discusses the rights of the plaintiff with respect to his refilement protections, non-refilement protections, that is.

If you look at the settlement agreement especially with respect to paragraph 3, it discusses the terms that obligate the Commonwealth, that it will not remove the plaintiff unless the minimum protections under the International Covenants are established in the system. It talks about protecting the plaintiff from removal, the plaintiffs. It talks about the proposed legislation and stating that if there's any amendments to the, those legislations after the settlement agreement, it would not apply to the plaintiff if facing removal. It nowhere discusses any issues regarding derivative asylum or derivative refugee protection.

THE COURT: Well, what about the settlement agreement? The settlement agreement contemplates that.

MR. CALIMBAS: The settlement agreement contemplates

it with respect to paragraph 12, but only to the extent of any claims related to the consolidated action. Now that's subject to interpretation. Any claims related to the consolidated action, we would argue, is with respect to the plaintiff's claims protection, not with respect to the claim of family reunification, which in fact is a whole other right and other cause of action that this, this matter is involving.

THE COURT: Well, in the Second Amended Complaint, that was prayed for.

MR. CALIMBAS: Well, that was --

THE COURT: So the plaintiff had to know that he was waiving any cause of action that could have been brought.

MR. CALIMBAS: Well, I think we have to turn to the settlement agreement and, which doesn't discuss that issue in particular. We have to, we have to make sure that res judicata is applied properly. And just because a settlement agreement extends to claims related to the consolidated action previously doesn't necessarily mean it would extend ad infinitum.

The complaint that was before the court, the most recent one in that consolidated action, the Fifth Amended Complaint, talks about the plaintiff's history. It talks about the violence that he was submitted to, the persecution in Bangladesh, and that his family was submitted to, and the threats involved there. That was, that was his story.

What we're dealing with now is a different cause

of action, a different set of facts. We're in a situation now where he is wanting to exercise his right to family association. We're dealing with a fundamental right that's been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about that for a moment. His family has to be here in Saipan to get that. That's issue number one. And issue number two, what is your position about the United States? They, the Commonwealth has plenary authority over Immigration here, at least, until the minimum of next year and maybe beyond that.

MR. CALIMBAS: That's correct, but that doesn't allow the U.S. Government to contravene the equal protection clause. The Immigration and Nationality Act does not apply here for now, but there are aspects of refugee protection under the, under the Refugee Act of 1980 that do apply here.

For example, putting asylees aside, refugee protection under federal law does not require presence in the U.S.

Refugee protection under INA, Section 207 --

THE COURT: Well, you just said that the Commonwealth has plenary authority over Immigration, not the United States, didn't you?

MR. CALIMBAS: That's correct. It has plenary authority. But I would turn to a decision made by this court. In fact, it was on a Motion to Dismiss in one of the earlier related cases, Jamil Ahmed, Jamil Ahmed case, Civil Action

00-05.

COURT REPORTER: What's the number again?

MR. CALIMBAS: Civil Action No. 00-0005, in which this court did discuss INA, Section 207, regarding refugee protection and not asylum protection, and did comment in how that would be, how it would have to apply to CNMI based refugees, and that it would be absurd to have refugee protection applied to any other refugee in the world except for those in the CNMI.

THE COURT: Well, was that the holding of the case?

MR. CALIMBAS: No, that wasn't the holding, Your

Honor. That was -- but the idea here is if that's allowed, we have, we have different treatment. We have a classification issue that invokes Fourteenth Amendment issues, where you have U.S. Government treating asylees and refugees differently in the CNMI.

With respect to asylees, the U.S. Government basically wipes its hand and said, "we're going to transfer that to the CNMI Government." But with respect to refugees, it's argued that refugees may be able to avail of the protections under INA, Section 207.

Under INA, Section 207 and the statutes promulgated under that provision, it provides for a derivative status for family members, basically, spouses and children as defined under the INA.

So here we have the U.S. Government potentially accepting those applications for refugees status and allowing for family reunification for those refugees anywhere in the world, including the CNMI, yet, saying for people who are applying for non-refilement protection in the CNMI will defer, will basically be abandoned and deferred to the CNMI Government, and tacitly allow for non-family reunification.

And here, we have a classification. We have a difference here, a different treatment where asylees -- well, let me put it this way -- where refugees applying for protection under the CNMI law would be treated differently when they could easily apply for refugee protection under Section 207 of the INA and get family reunification. And that's where we see the U.S. Government having a problem with its policy there.

Just to close up on the res judicata issue, I think with settlement agreements, again, the settlement agreement has to show an -- there still has to be the conditions regarding the identity of the cause of action, identity of parties, identity of the subject matter. I think what is evident is that the cause of action is not identical in this situation.

We're dealing with a family reunification issue.

We're dealing with a fundamental right protected under the

Fourteenth Amendment that allows for a parent to raise his

family and make decisions on behalf of his children. And this

has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court; and, in fact,

the Ninth Circuit in a dissent has discussed that issue in the context of removal proceedings, and how international, customary international law has evolved to the point where it does recognize family reunification as a fundamental right.

And that's reflected in the recommendations under the 1951

Convention. It is a provision in the international covenant on civil and political rights. It's also in the convention on the rights of a child.

THE COURT: Can that be waived?

MR. CALIMBAS: The U.S. Congress can waive a -- the U.S. Congress can make --

THE COURT: I'm talking about the plaintiff. Can the plaintiff waive that right to effect a settlement?

MR. CALIMBAS: I'd have to -- I could brief the court on that matter. I, I --

THE COURT: Well, I don't need it. I mean, you have fundamental rights that you can waive. Isn't that true?

MR. CALIMBAS: I, --

THE COURT: Miranda Rights.

MR. CALIMBAS: I couldn't answer. I --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CALIMBAS: But my point is that in fact what we're dealing here is with the different, with different rights and a different cause of action. And res judicata should not apply in that situation.

THE COURT: Would it apply if it said in the settlement agreement, "And I waive any cause of action in the future to bring my family to the CNMI."?

MR. CALIMBAS: I believe that would be a stronger argument for saying that res judicata applies.

THE COURT: Well, what is the difference between that and settling between all causes of action known at the time of the settlement? Because we know that the attorney and the plaintiff knew that that was an issue because they had previously raised it in an earlier Second Amended Complaint.

MR. CALIMBAS: That's correct, and I think it's significant that it's not, it wasn't raised in the most, in the Fifth Amended Complaint. And it's not, it's not clear in the settlement agreement.

What's clear is when you look at the paragraphs and you look at the language of all of the paragraphs in the settlement agreement, especially what I was referring to in paragraph 3, it's talking about protections for the plaintiff per se. It's talking about preventing removal of the plaintiff. It's talking protections that the plaintiff would receive and not in regard to family reunification.

THE COURT: I think you would have a much stronger argument if the Second Amended Complaint didn't exist that had the cause of action to bring his family here, because in the settlement agreement he agrees that he is effecting the

settlement for all causes of action, known and unknown and a whole bunch of other adjectives. But anyway, do you have anything further?

MR. CALIMBAS: I wanted to make sure it's on the record. I'm not sure it's spelled out in the plaintiff's briefs. But just to point out that we believe the CNMI Government definitely has an obligation under Section 102 of the Covenant to conform to any U.S. treaties. And I've named several that the U.S. has acceded to. And I believe those are in the briefs. And those treaties in the treaty provisions would reflect a right to family reunification, and basically a parent's right and even the child's right to family life, and that the CNMI Government by not having those family reunification provisions in its non-refilement protection system would be contravening the Covenant.

THE COURT: You may be right if we ever got there.

But it appears to the court that all of that's been waived in the settlement agreement.

MR. CALIMBAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Any counsel for the defense want to be heard, make any record?

MS. CRUZ: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: Why don't you come up so that we can get a good record?

MS. CRUZ: Your Honor, I will be addressing the issues of res judicata, and Mr. Lawrance will be addressing any remaining issues in our Motion to Dismiss.

The crux of the plaintiff's prior lawsuit was the fact that he was look, he was seeking a process to apply for asylee or refugee status and to avail himself with the benefits of those, of the asylee and refugee status, namely, protection against violence, protection against torture, and protection for his family located outside the CNMI.

Now the Ninth Circuit when it's considering whether the cause of action in a subsequent lawsuit is the same cause of action in a previous lawsuit, it looks to whether there's substantially the similar evidence, whether there's the same infringement of rights, and whether it's the same nucleus of operative facts.

Here, the plaintiff is relying on the same incidents of violence against his family that he relied upon in his previous lawsuit, which is also shown in the Fifth Amended Complaint about lawsuit. He's also arguing for the same process to seek protection for his family located outside the CNMI.

The settlement agreement is clear on its face. The plaintiff waived and released any rights that he had to claims arising out of the transactions or occurrences of the previous lawsuit. And clearly, as shown in the Fifth Amended Complaint,

protection for his family is something that he sought in his previous lawsuit. And the Settlement Agreement, along with the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, which was stipulated to by the plaintiff as well as the United States, operates to bar his claims, as being barred under the Doctrine of Res Judicata.

And unless the court has any questions, I have nothing further.

THE COURT: I don't. Anybody else?

MR. LAWRANCE: Good morning, Your Honor. Victor Lawrance for the United States. Pleasure to be here from Washington, D.C.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. LAWRANCE: I just want to say a few words with respect to the equal protection argument raised by the plaintiffs.

You know, they claim that as a refugee that they're treated differently. But the reality is that Mr. Hossain was granted protection from refilement under the CNMI laws. The INA, the Immigration Nationality Act does not apply to the CNMI. And, as Your Honor mentioned, the CNMI has plenary, and as counsel agreed, the CNMI has plenary authority over Immigration up until at least June 1st, 2009, or it may be extended up to a 180 days.

So, accordingly, Mr. Hossain is not similarly situated to refugees or asylees under the Immigration Nationality Act.

He's subject to a different set of, a different law, the law of the CNMI. Therefore, no equal protection claim or due process claim arises.

And that's really -- I'm not familiar with the DICTA in the Ahmed opinion that plaintiff's counsel raised. But plaintiff counsel did indicate that that was just DICTA and not holding of the court.

And therefore, I really have nothing else to add to this unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: I don't, Mr. Lawrance.

Ms. Busenkell, did you want to make any record?

MS. BUSENKELL: No, Your Honor. The Commonwealth would rest on its motion.

THE COURT: I am going to adopt my tentative ruling.

And I will issue a written order denying or granting both of the motions, and possibly might add other than the res judicata issue. But I think that's primarily the reason why the court is granting the motions.

There being nothing further to come before the court at this time, we'll stand in recess.

(Court recessed at 9:25 a.m., Thursday, October 16, 2008.)

COMMONWEALTH OF THE 1 NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 2 SS. SAIPAN, MP 3 4 5 I, SANAE N. SHMULL, Retired Official Court Reporter 6 7 for the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, do hereby certify: 8 9 That the foregoing Motion to Dismiss transcript in Mohammed Kamal Hossain v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 10 Islands, et al., Civil Case No. 08-0016, consisting of 14 11 pages, was taken down by me stenographically and with a backup 12 13 tape-recording device at the time and place indicated herein. That the foregoing record is a true and correct record 14 of the proceedings transcribed by me to the best of my ability 15 at the request of plaintiff Mohammed Kamal Hossain for appeal 16 purposes. 17 I further certify that I am not interested in the 18 events of the action. 19 20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and 21 signature this 20th day of February, 2009. 22 23 /S/ Sanae N. Shmull 24

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SANAE N. SHMULL Retired Official Court Reporter